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In April 2013, an online education enterprise called edX — a joint project 
of Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology — announced 
that it had created software capable of automatically grading student 
essays. The news, coupled with the expectation that the software will soon 
become widely used, generated a heated debate. Speaking to the New York 
Times, edX president Anant Agarwal argued that the software is superior 
to traditional grading methods because it provides “instant feedback,” 
making it possible for students to rewrite and improve their essays until 
they get a passing score from the machine. Critics responded that the soft-
ware relies on seemingly irrelevant or arbitrary criteria — like the pres-
ence of particular keywords in the essay — that don’t necessarily indicate 
coherent thought, and may allow the software to be easily duped.
The software is based on machine-learning techniques derived 
from artificial intelligence research. Using essays already marked by a 
human grader, along with rubrics that associate quantifiable features of a 
text — such as the presence or absence of specific terms or phrases — with 
an evaluative score, the software creates a model for predicting the score 
a human grader would assign to future essays. The statistical methods 
behind these learning techniques even allow the software to create “con-
fidence values,” which indicate the likelihood that the predicted grade will 
match that of a human grader. Professors can then re-grade the essays 
scored by the machine to improve the accuracy of the software.
The software’s makers argue that, because its learning model is based 
on human-generated scores, there is an assurance of both relevance and 
quality control. The point of the software, in their view, is not to replace 
professors but to increase their efficiency, especially in large classes. The 
software is particularly designed for use in the new realm of “massive 
open online courses” (MOOCs, in the unfortunate acronym), where, like 
in traditional classrooms, a large class size poses a challenge to learn-
ing how to write. This software, in theory, allows graded essays to be a 
real component of these courses, making the writing process itself more 
fruitful than in classes where students might otherwise get fully engaged 
feedback from the professor only on their final draft.
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Supporters of edX, like the University of Akron’s Mark D. Shermis, 
point out that many critics of the software come from good colleges, 
where professors teach smaller-than-average classes and so are able to 
provide students with above-average feedback on their written work. For 
everyone else, as Agarwal puts it, “the quality of the [software’s] grad-
ing is similar to the variation you find from instructor to instructor.” Put 
another way, since most professors grade like robots anyway, the software 
is arguably a net gain in efficiency. Perhaps the real reason we ought to 
be wary of the software is that it asks us to embrace this false mindset of 
what essay grading is.
Functionalism and Its Discontents
The philosophical roots of the software approach to educating the mind 
lie in a computational view of the mind — a theory of cognition known as 
functionalism. The theory holds that the mind is defined not by the physi-
cal stuff it is made of, but by what it does. When we describe aspects of 
the mind, what matters is the way they transform the mind’s input, in the 
form of sense data, into its output, in the form of speech and action. The 
upshot of this theory is that one can have minds without brains, and rep-
licate mental functions using stuff other than brains. In other words, the 
theory provides a metaphysical foundation for the possibility of artificial 
intelligence, as well as a loose guide to how to go about creating it.
Consider a classic functionalist analogy. The purpose of a mousetrap 
is to catch and kill mice. This task can be broken down into smaller tasks: 
a mousetrap requires a baiter, a trigger, a trapper, and a killer. Many 
devices made of many materials can satisfy these functional conditions 
for being a mousetrap. A steel spring on balsa wood or a baited ruler bal-
anced on a bucket of water both catch and kill mice using baiters, triggers, 
trappers, and killers. A common housecat, though it does not use triggers, 
baiters, or trappers like a mechanical mousetrap, still fulfills the function 
of catching and killing mice (if the cat happens to be a good mouser), and 
so, according to functionalism, even a housecat has a claim to being called 
a mousetrap, equal to any of these machines.
The functionalist holds that what is true of mousetraps is true of 
minds. Consider the following scenario (which is a gussied up version of 
another classic functionalist thought experiment, this one proposed by 
Alan Turing). Suppose a literature professor with a deep-seated animos-
ity toward mustaches is grading two essays about Hamlet. Judging from 
the essays’ mechanics, cogency, and insight into the play, the professor 
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deems them worthy of the same grade. If it is subsequently revealed that a 
mustached person wrote one essay and a clean-shaven person the other, it 
would be plainly irrational for the professor to deny them the same mark: 
the essays are functionally equivalent, and the fact that the professor has 
an animus against an irrelevant feature of one of the essay writers does 
not provide a sound basis for assigning a different grade to one essay 
over another. By the same token, if it were revealed to a denier of artificial 
intelligence that a flesh-and-blood human student and an essay-writing 
computer produced otherwise equivalent essays, it must be an irrational 
bias to insist that a mind produced one essay but no mind produced the 
other. To deny this is to succumb to what Ned Block once called neural 
“chauvinism.”
Supported by thought experiments like these, the functionalist theory 
of mind offers some distinct advantages over competing theories. First, it 
is open-minded about what kinds of stuff minds are made of. We should 
not mistake the fact that minds in our world are — so far — made of bio-
logical stuff with the claim that mentality must be biologically grounded. 
Perhaps mentality is “multiply realizable” in neurons, and in silicon, and 
in whatever other stuff. Mind isn’t an essence; it’s a job description. 
Functionalism is also perfectly consistent with a physicalist understand-
ing of the mind, and gives us the tantalizing prospect of one day forming 
a completely naturalistic explanation of the formerly mysterious human 
“soul.” With a blueprint of the mind, a map of what neural stuff performs 
each mental function, we will be able to manipulate and improve the mind, 
just like a mousetrap.
However, functionalism’s critics believe there is a question-begging 
assumption at its heart. The functionalist argues that if two essays are 
functionally equivalent, then what produced each essay must be a mind, 
even if one of the essays was in fact produced by a machine. But as philos-
opher John Searle famously argued in his Chinese Room thought experi-
ment, the functionalist argument ignores the distinction between derived 
and original meaning. Words have derived intentionality because we use 
words as artificial vehicles to express concepts. If the mind is like a well-
spring of meaning, words are like cups, shells for transmitting to others 
what they cannot themselves create. The same is true of all conventional 
signs. Just as a map is not a navigator and an emoticon is not an emotion, 
a computer is not a mind: it cannot create meaning, but can only copy it. 
The difference between a Shakespearean sonnet and the same sequence 
of letters as the sonnet produced randomly by a thousand typing mon-
keys — or machines — is that a mind inscribed one with semantic meaning 
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but not the other. When Shakespeare writes a sonnet, the words convey 
the thoughts that are in his mind, whereas when a mindless machine gen-
erates the same sequence of words, there are simply no thoughts behind 
those words. In short, functionalism’s focus on the behavioral concept 
of “functional equivalence” forgets that a sign depends on the meaning 
it signifies. We cannot treat syntactically equivalent texts as evidence of 
semantically equivalent origins.
Put another way: I don’t give plagiarized papers the same grade I give 
original papers, even if the text of the two papers is exactly the same. The 
reason is that the plagiarized paper is no sign: it does not represent the stu-
dent’s thinking. Or we might say that it is a false sign, meaning something 
other than what it most obviously appears to. If anything, what I can infer 
from a plagiarized paper is that its author is the functional equivalent of a 
mirror. As a mirror is sightless — its images are not its own — so too is a 
plagiarized paper mindless, all of its meaning stolen from a genuine mind. 
In a Dantean contrapasso, I grade plagiarizers with a mark harsher than 
the F that recognizes an original but failed attempt at thought: I drop 
them from my course and shake the dust from my feet. We should do the 
same with functionalism.
John Henry’s Retort
Of course, essay-grading software is not functionally equivalent to a pro-
fessor in the first place, even for the narrow purpose of providing feedback 
on academic essays. It cannot be, because grading is a morally significant 
act that computers are incapable of performing. Functionalism, in falsely 
reducing human acts to mechanical tasks, also reduces the polyvalent lan-
guage of moral value to a single, inappropriate metric.
If minds are computers, then they should be evaluated by norms appro-
priate to computers: namely, by their efficiency in mapping inputs to outputs. 
So if professors and grading software are functional equivalents — outside 
of the Ivy League, at least — then they should be evaluated using the 
same criteria: the number of comments they write per paper, their aver-
age response time, the degree to which their marks vary from a statisti-
cal mean, and so on. This is the latent normative view of functionalism, 
particularly when it’s turned from a philosophical theory into a technical 
program: if machines can perform some task more efficiently than human 
beings, then machines are better at it. However, efficiency is not the moral 
metric we should be concerned with in education, or in other essentially 
interpersonal, relational areas of human life.
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The functional- and efficiency-centric view of technology, and the 
moral objections to it, have been around for a long time. Look to the tale 
of John Henry, the steel-driving man of American folklore who raced a 
tunnel-boring steam engine in a contest of efficiency, beating the machine 
but dying in the attempt. The moral of the tale is not, of course, that 
we will always be able to beat our machines in a fair contest. Rather, the 
contest is a tragic one, highlighting a cultural hamartia, namely, the belief 
that competing with the steam engine on its own terms is anything other 
than degrading. Consider that, in some versions, John Henry was a freed 
slave; his freely undertaken labor, in contrast to the pistons of the steam 
engine, was a sign of economic justice. Consider that John Henry may 
have been working to support a family, or to save for a homestead of his 
own, or to buy others out of slavery — that his daily labor was a labor of 
love. The steam engine worked for no reasons of its own. Consider finally 
how Henry’s voluntary martyrdom demonstrated manly virtues like cour-
age and willpower that the steam engine couldn’t replicate even if it had 
won. For all of these reasons, John Henry’s labor possessed a moral sig-
nificance that the operation of the steam engine did not. His actions were 
invested with the dignity of the man himself, with what C. S. Lewis called 
the “weight of glory.” The death of John Henry is therefore an objection to 
the contest itself — a nineteenth-century version of the Turing Test — to 
its implicit belief that the labor of a man and the operation of a machine 
are simply equivalent.
This is not, of course, an argument against mechanization as such. 
There are many tasks where, for the purposes with which we’re concerned, 
mechanizing the task is better than having a person perform it. Digging 
tunnels and washing dishes are two such tasks that come to mind, even if 
the mechanization of these tasks leads to a loss of specific virtues associ-
ated with them. For example, we might respond to Adam Smith’s concern 
in The Wealth of Nations that the division of labor leads to a general loss of 
citizens’ military virtue by pointing out that these virtues are no longer 
necessary in contemporary society outside of a specialized military force, 
and that such virtues are available in other areas of life, such as organized 
sports. Still, as Harvard political philosopher Michael Sandel has asserted 
about the monetization of civic and familial duties, there are some kinds 
of mechanization where certain things that we’re interested in will be lost 
and cannot easily be had in another way.
Consider a real and recent case. Yu Suzuki and colleagues at Kyoto 
Sangyo University have developed “smart” kitchens to teach budding chefs 
how to cook. One places a fish on the countertop, punches in a recipe, and 
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the room takes over. After detecting the fish, the kitchen projects dotted 
lines and animated knives to help the chef fillet the fish, tracks the inter-
nal temperature of the fish, orders the chef to flip it when needed, and so 
on. Here we should ask an obvious question: at the end of a culinary edu-
cation dispensed in such a manner, what will a good chef know or be able 
to do? Presumably, the best chefs will be those who most efficiently and 
accurately carried out the kitchen’s directions. These technicians will not 
need to know anything about food, cooking, or culinary aesthetics at all; 
this knowledge might even cause the cooks to second-guess the kitchen, 
becoming a source of inefficiency and error.
It is a familiar functionalist pattern: a tool is invented that imitates 
the behavior of chefs, and is presumed on that basis to be equivalent to 
the chef. The result is what the French sociologist Bruno Latour (draw-
ing on Madeleine Akrich) called “prescription” — the normative evaluation 
and control of human behavior by machines. Suzuki’s chefs are going to 
be judged by the standards appropriate for tools, that is, their efficiency 
in performing mindless tasks. The traditional virtues or excellences of 
the chef, including culinary innovation and creativity, will become either 
irrelevant in the evaluation of the chef or even detrimental to their culi-
nary performance — the functional equivalent of a system error. In short, 
functionalism does more than metaphysically reduce the mental to the 
mechanical; it also displaces robust moral and aesthetic categories with 
narrow technical norms.
Although we could repeat the thought experiment with human sol-
diers and robotic drones, or any number of other substitutions, our topic is 
education. So suppose we use edX’s software in a smart-classroom to teach 
professors how to grade essays in the same way smart-kitchens teach 
chefs to cook. The classroom would project comments and corrections 
onto student papers for professors to trace, increasing grading efficiency 
by turning the term paper into the linguistic equivalent of the multiple-
choice exam. Would this make professors better professors, or the educa-
tional system more educational? Functionalists are committed to thinking 
that it would — that professors are deficient in ways that can be improved 
in terms measurable by efficiency, that these terms are appropriate ways 
of measuring what it is that professors do, and that if professors can be 
improved in these measures then they should.
The functionalist must think that these are innocent assumptions and 
meaningless questions, since he believes that whatever acts like a pro-
fessor is a professor, in the same way that, as far as John Henry’s C&O 
Railroad was concerned, whatever acted like a steel-driving man is a steel-
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driver. The functionalist has purged moral qualities from his ontological 
catalogue. For most everyone else, this approach falsely turns qualitative 
goods into quantitative, procedural ones — the same mistake made by the 
rich young man in the Gospels who, having satisfied the Mosaic law, asked 
Jesus whether anything else was needed for eternal life. It is an error that 
fails to distinguish between art and technique.
The Moral Art of Grading
Art, unlike technique, requires an understanding of the nature and pur-
pose of one’s subject. Being a good builder of houses only requires carpen-
try skills and the ability to follow a blueprint, but a good builder of homes 
understands that homes are for people, and tailors his designs accord-
ing to their physical, aesthetic, spiritual, and political impact on human 
beings. For instance, one wouldn’t praise an architect for making rest-
rooms out of glass and living rooms out of foot-thick cast iron, since the 
former would frustrate our modesty and the latter our sociability. Every 
building presupposes some conception of what a person is, and thus what 
people are for. The large, lockable bedrooms of modern American homes, 
for instance, like the “family” rooms designed around television, suggest 
that what people primarily do at home involves spending time apart until 
they come together to passively consume entertainment. The architect is 
a philosopher in brick and mortar. As poems do with words, music with 
rhythm and melody, and paintings with color and shape, architecture 
manifests in form, mass, and ornament the aspirations (or perversions) of 
the human heart. Every art is anthropology.
The same is true of grading. Responding to and evaluating students’ 
written work does more than just describe students, or distinguish them. 
Grading is also pedagogical: it corrects and informs, rewards and rein-
forces someone’s understanding of the world. Because it has the potential 
to change a student, grading is a moral hazard. Grading well requires 
knowing what human beings are for and educating them accordingly; 
how and why one grades is a confession of one’s beliefs about the ultimate 
destiny of man. A professor is an architect of the intellectual life, mak-
ing castles of minds and cathedrals of culture — or slums and factories, 
as the case may be. EdX’s software would reduce the professor to the 
equivalent of a house-builder following a blueprint, oblivious to its moral 
design. Yet every tool has a design, and therefore an ideology. If we refuse 
to be passive users of other people’s tools — and so tools ourselves — we 
must ask the designers of such software the same question Plato asked of 
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 government in the Republic: what vision of humanity does it presume and 
therefore seek to bring about? Who guards the guardians from degener-
ate anthropologies and perverse moral visions?
Consider one such vision. Educators with a corporatocratic or con-
sumerist understanding of their profession — shopkeepers in scholars’ 
clothing — believe we assign grades in order to give employers a quantita-
tive measure by which to compare the skills of potential employees. Like 
prices, grades signal to potential buyers the quality of the university’s 
products, and thus the potential return on a financial investment. With 
their belief in the supremacy of self-interest and market forces, the con-
sumerist model of grading gives the merchant university an incentive to 
inflate student grades when helping their customers (the students), sell 
themselves to employers. Such grade inflation is contrary to the interests 
of the capitalists who use grades as signs of the relative quality of poten-
tial employees. The job market’s demand for informative grades is expe-
rienced by professors as administrative pressure to resist grade inflation. 
But of course, under the consumerist model, keeping marks reasonably 
low is contrary to the interests of students, who seek to be branded in 
ways that will attract the highest bidder.
From the students’ perspective, their marks do not need to be truth-
ful, or to represent their mastery of any subject. (A student once justified 
her grade appeal to me not by demonstrating her command of the course 
material, but by reasoning that it “couldn’t hurt, and could help” her 
graduate and secure a job.) Students who do receive good marks reward 
their professors with praise on the course evaluations by which universi-
ties partially determine which professors to retain or tenure.
In short, the consumerist model of grading makes students, profes-
sors, the university, and employers competitors in an unregulated market. 
It is in the short-term self-interest of each participant to deceive all the 
others. For instance, it is in the interest of professors to withhold from 
students details about their grades, and of students to pressure profes-
sors into revealing those details in order to negotiate the grade and gain 
a competitive advantage over other students. Teaching and learning are, 
needless to say, far from the highest priorities set by the incentives in a 
consumerist university.
To participate in such a system is to condone its assumptions about 
the nature of the human person and our theological destiny. In its nomi-
nalist and cutthroat universe, grades are seen as results of contingent 
conjunctions of arbitrary preferences and undeserved power (especially 
in the liberal arts). This consumerist model of grading and of education 
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is only appropriate if life is for no more than food and the body for no 
more than clothing. As a Catholic philosopher, I believe we are made for 
the bread and wine of a different Eucharist. I believe that wisdom and 
moral virtues are good for their own sakes, because, as Pope John Paul II 
writes in his Gratissimam sane (Letter to Families), human beings, who are 
the embodiment of these virtues, have been willed from all eternity for 
their own sake, loved into existence in a creative act of infinite generosity. 
Knowledge comes in several kinds — technical, moral, and scientific — of 
which the former is instrumentally valuable, and the latter are intrinsi-
cally good, because they are for man. Our most valuable pursuits are 
those in which we can have only a disinterested interest — that is, one not 
governed by purposes outside of these pursuits — such as philosophy, lit-
erature, music, and humor, because they are fundamentally forms of love, 
in Whose image we are made. The soul was made for play and worship, 
not consumption. As a dying farmer plants for future generations what he 
will not himself consume, so too is teaching an act of caritas, of passing on 
to another person, for his own sake, the moral, cultural, and intellectual 
treasure that others entrusted to us. To grade with such a worldview is 
to exercise something other than the avarice of the consumer model, and 
something even more than justice.
Religious and secular thinkers alike should be able to grasp this point. 
Grading should communicate not only what students have achieved but 
what they can. A professor can encourage intelligent but lazy students 
with a lower grade than their work strictly merits, and struggling but 
passionate students with one higher. The principle is far truer for the 
written responses professors make to student papers. Good professors 
will challenge a gifted student to address an overlooked problem on a 
passable term paper purely for the joy of initiating him or her into the 
life of the mind. They will discourage the well-meaning student from fol-
lowing a line of thought whose path that they know to be littered with 
intellectual blind alleys and moral dead ends. And what professor hasn’t 
been blessed to discover a new challenge, implication, question, or line of 
inquiry because of an insightful or prescient student paper?
To grade as if the point were to identify and label mistakes is to grade 
as mechanics give estimates: this is what is broken and what it will cost 
to fix. To grade with charity is to treat students not as busted but as 
becoming. It is to take even their mistaken ideas seriously when they are 
sincerely offered, by responding with truth and with hope. It means treat-
ing grading as a means to continue a conversation older than any of us, 
and wisdom as both a goal and a common good.
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The machine cannot grade with caritas any more than it can make mis-
takes or any more than it can learn. It cannot correct, suggest, encourage, 
or be surprised. It therefore cannot say whether the executions of Socrates 
and Christ were tragic or comic or any other weighty thing, nor could it 
change its mind about such matters mid-program, as an honest professor 
might do in the face of a novel argument in a cogent student essay. The 
conclusion that professors and grading machines are functionally equiva-
lent is plausible only if we have already presumed that persons are essen-
tially machine-like, describable and evaluable according to discrete and non-
 overlapping functions, and that they don’t transcend these functions in any 
way relevant to learning. To use computers to mark student essays is thus 
to posit a technocratic view of knowledge and an instrumentalist conception 
of the person — which amounts to denying the existence of persons at all.
A Liberal Education of Love
Let me restate the argument first perspicuously and then suggestively. 
Grading is an interpersonal process that is constituted by certain norms, 
attitudes, and virtues that only contribute to human flourishing given a 
transcendent view of the person. Functionalizing this process displaces 
these norms with market values and a reductive view of the person, one 
that is especially antagonistic to the pursuit of wisdom that underlies the 
liberal arts. Technology that functionalizes an essentially interpersonal 
process corrodes the moral and eschatological foundations of the liberal 
arts, trading a pearl of great price for silicon dust. We should not devote 
ourselves so to the goals of consumerism; we are made for better ends, and 
a purpose of the liberal arts is to emancipate us from the mundane rather 
than to further mire us in it. While pedagogical efficiency is a valuable 
goal, simple technical efficiency is not the way to achieve it, not merely 
because it’s ineffective, but more importantly because it substitutes con-
sumerist ends for higher ones, and so corrupts and undermines the human 
excellences of wisdom and care that humane education aims to achieve.
EdX’s software presents us with a technical solution to a non-
 technical problem, which is roughly this: students need more people who 
can provide the detailed and meaningful feedback on their writing nec-
essary to improve their thought and character. For that, recall, is what 
learning is — a voluntary movement of one’s heart and mind toward the 
truth about the world and oneself, and the ends of each. Since writing is 
but a sign of our thoughts and desires, one cannot expect to accomplish 
this learning through the mere syntactic rearrangement of signs.
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Learning requires love. All good writers have that teacher, that dear 
reader in the back of their heads, of whom we ask, “Will he love this?” 
Only love moves us to imitation, so that we can be good for the beloved 
rather than merely pleasing. So the student loves the teacher and desires 
to imitate him, and the teacher loves the student and so imitates — whom? 
Not the student, for he is the learner. Someone else, then. Can words be 
copies of copies all the way down — or up? Much as I desire to know the 
answer to that question, I cannot ask it of a computer, nor do I care to, for 
it cannot answer, nor care to.
What is required is someone interested in discussing these questions 
with me. Such friends are in short supply, as perhaps they always have been. 
Giving us an army of robot imitators will not solve that problem. The 
underlying motivation for edX’s software is the laudable desire to provide 
what is much in demand but little in supply: patient, loving, discerning edu-
cators. But we cannot operationalize this educator as a “feedback provider,” 
any more than we can monetize friendship — for the friend you pay for is not 
your friend. Attempting to do so will not increase learning efficiency, because 
no true learning will be taking place — no metanoia, no change of heart and 
mind — but only the rearrangement and redirection of lesser appetites.
So what about Mark Shermis’s original argument — that good grading 
is labor-intensive, forbiddingly expensive, and impossible for professors 
who teach large classes? The consumerist basis of this argument is now 
plain. Everything Shermis said is true: it is impossible for professors to 
grade writing well when they teach large classes. EdX has suggested, and 
I have denied, that we can solve that problem with technology. I am sug-
gesting, and others will deny, that we could solve the problem by doing 
away with large universities — or at least with large class sizes — and 
instead filling small, liberal arts colleges with lots of competent profes-
sors who have the time and inclination to learn their students’ names.
This disagreement is not primarily about means, as if efficiency or 
mechanization were intrinsically bad. They’re not, or not always. Given 
that efficiency and relational teaching are not, as edX proponents would 
have us think, mutually exclusive, the debate is rather about why we should 
adopt a technology contrary to our ends. The only possible reason could 
be some other end. It goes by many names. I have called it consumerism. 
Marx called it, among other things, the commodity fetish. Neil Postman 
named it technopoly. What we need is a renewed evaluation of the gods or 
the narratives we take our schools and our culture to serve, since without 
such a discussion we are merely using evaluative jargon without achieving 
meaningful thought about the most important ends.
